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Introduction 
In April 2005, the Koizumi cabinet submitted a bill to the Japanese Diet which generated great 
debate within the Japanese government and public alike. The bill called for the privatization of 
Japan Post, which is the main body of the Japanese postal service. In July 2005, the House of 
Representatives passed a bill by five votes in favor of the privatization of Japan Post. In August, 
the House of Councilors courageously voted down the bill by seventeen votes, regardless of an 
admonition by Mr. Koizumi of a possible call for dissolution of the Diet.[1] As a result, Prime 
Minster Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives and called for re-election over the 
contentious issue of the privatization of Japan Post. 
Subsequently, on September 11, 2005, Japanese nationals re-elected Prime Minister Koizumi to 
another term in office. His victory was largely due to his personality as a political leader. He is 
direct and very coherent with his words, two characteristics that appeal to Japanese voters. 
Hence, in this particular election his obstinacy on the privatization of Japan Post is the issue that 
led to his success.[2] 
Although Mr. Koizumi personally believes that the privatization of Japan Post is an essential part 
of the central government reform he has been pursuing since the beginning of his term,[3] there 
are currently many other pressing policy issues in Japan that need to be discussed. The aging 
society and decreasing birth rate should be priorities on the cabinet’s agenda, as these are 
primary concerns of the people. An opinion poll conducted by Jiji Press LTD shows that the most 
pressing issues that need resolution and improvement are social security system reform—
including action on pension plans—and Medicare. 68.8 percent of the public identified these 
issues as their priority.[4] The issue of Japan Post privatization ranked twelfth out of sixteen 
issues, and was identified by only 6.7 percent of people as the number one priority. Regardless of 
public opinion, however, Mr. Koizumi insisted that the privatization of Japan Post be his political 
mission, and the September election was entirely centered around this contentious issue.  
In this article, I seek to highlight the issues surrounding the September re-election of Mr. Koizumi. 
I highlight both what has openly been discussed—Prime Minister Koizumi’s argument on 
privatization—as well as what has not been openly discussed—the missing piece from the 
privatization debate. I seek to show that despite making the issues surrounding Japan Post the 
base of his political platform, Mr. Koizumi neglected to discuss the potential risks and downsides 
to the privatization of Japan Post. 
Koizumi's “Small Government” Argument 
From his first day in the cabinet, Prime Minister Koizumi has been resolute in his political goal of 
organizational reform. As a result of the reform, he hopes to achieve a “small government” to cut 
government expenditures in this financially difficult time for Japan. Mr. Koizumi strongly believes 
that his goal of small government can be achieved by slimming down the number of government 
employees. His ultimate goal of the privatization of the postal service buttresses his overall 
emphasis on small government. 
In his election campaign, Mr. Koizumi reiterated that privatizing Japan Post would be the best 
way to cut down on the number of government employees. Mr. Koizumi simply looks at the 
number of workers in different government agencies to make his argument that Japan Post has a 
large number of employees, and—therefore—in order to achieve a smaller government, Japan 
needs to cut the number of postal employees. The entire police force in Japan today accounts for 
about 250,000 people, while the Self Defense Force personnel number around 240,000. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of 6,000 staff. In contrast, Japan Post is supported by about 
380,000 workers.[5] 
It is obvious that Mr. Koizumi ignores the fact that Japan Post workers are not paid with taxpayer 
money. Since its current organizational establishment as a public corporation on April 1, 2003, 
Japan Post’s corporate law states that Japan Post must adopt a self-supporting accounting 
system which allows it to be financially independent of the government.[6] Since 2003, Japan 
Post has succeeded in not only being financially independent but has also been able to generate 
surplus revenue. The purpose of privatization for any government office is to transfer 
governmental duties to the private sector to decrease governmental expenditures. However, if 
these 380,000 people are not part of the government payroll, then why does Mr. Koizumi insist 
that eliminating them is the best solution? 
One of the answers is the economic stagnation that Japan has been suffering from and has been 
struggling to overcome. Mr. Koizumi deems that Japan Post assets can be more properly utilized 
if the private sector is in charge. The postal service possesses an enormous amount of financial 
resources. It enjoys 340 trillion yen (a little more than $3 trillion USD) in assets. Mr. Koizumi 
argues that the privatization of Japan Post will facilitate the entry of these assets into the market 
economy, which will lead to more dynamic economic activities in Japan. However, some critics 
point out that if there are no domestic industries or infrastructures into which that money can be 
wisely invested, then the benefit of the investment will not be maximized domestically. Also, an 
additional risk is the chance that the money will be invested overseas rather than within Japan.[7] 
In his campaign, Mr. Koizumi successfully avoided questions raised by the Japan Democratic 
Party (JDP) and other critics on the issues mentioned above. Why do we need the privatization 
when Japan Post went through a major reform two years ago, and now it is generating substantial 
revenues? What does the privatization do for the Japanese people? How will Mr. Koizumi achieve 
the transaction? Substantial explanations to these important questions were owed but never 
given.  
The Missing Piece in the Privatization Debate 
On September 22, 1985, the Plaza Agreement was signed by the United States and Japan. In the 
course of negotiations, the United States demanded a policy change from Japan—specifically, 
less exports and more domestic consumption. That meant that Japan had to seek additional 
revenue to spend on domestic industries. The obvious target for the Japanese government was 
the postal saving plan, which was established in the 8th Meiji period (1875),[8] and today is called 
Yu-cho, and Postal Life Insurance, called Kampo. The assets collected were typically used for 
public works and infrastructure development projects. 
Today Yu-cho is a major source of funds for the government and public agencies. It accounts for 
90 percent of local bonds, Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) Agency Bonds, and 
national bond funding. As of June 2005, the total number of national bonds issued and national 
debt associated with Yu-cho amounted to 796 trillion yen.[9] At the end of August 2005, 55.8 
percent of Yu-cho financial resources, which equal 116 trillion yen, were spent on the purchase of 
national bonds while 4.4 percent (9.3 trillion yen) were spent on local bonds.[10] 
Government bonds which cannot be redeemed are refinanced as refinancing bonds. By 2008, it 
is projected that refinancing bonds will be worth up to 134 trillion yen (over $1 trillion USD). That 
is three times more than the estimated government tax revenue in 2008. In addition to the 
refinancing bonds, other bonds—such as government bonds, local bonds and FILP Agency 
bonds—will be issued as scheduled. The total value of all Japanese bonds may be worth up to 
200 trillion yen by 2008,[11] while the estimated revenue of Japan Post will decrease by 210 to 
230 trillion yen over the next ten years.[12] This causes serious concern over whether all the 
bonds can be digested. If the redemption of 200 trillion yen (a little less than $2 trillion USD) is not 
possible, then a slump may not be avoidable. Now that Prime Minister Koizumi has been given 
permission to go ahead and implement postal privatization, the plan is to complete the 
privatization by April of 2007. If Yu-cho is privatized in 2007, and the possible slump occurs in 
2008, the Japanese government technically will not be responsible for a probable loss. This 
implies that Japanese nationals as investors may have to incur the loss themselves. 
Mr. Koizumi repeatedly sermonized that “reform” almost always brings about “pain.” Yet he fell 
short in explaining to the public what sort of pain the privatization will bring about, and how to 
cure the pain. Having substantial arguments and being able to logically explain what and how 
specific policies will benefit and/or hurt the public demonstrates the scale of a politician, and 
should be valued more than a politician being resolute in his/her personal agenda. 
The essential issue regarding the assets of Yu-cho is how the government will utilize them—not 
the number of Japan Post workers or the huge assets of Yu-cho. An important first step in 
tackling the economic problems Japan faces today is to decrease the government’s financial 
deficit and the waste of Yu-cho assets on unnecessary public works and infrastructure building. 
Holding the Ministry of Finance, which has the decision-making authority, accountable for the use 
of Yu-cho assets would be a step in the right direction. Without solving such structural 
fundamental problems, promoting the privatization of Japan Post is a mere delusion. 
Conclusion 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s suggested reforms of the privatization of Japan Post lack a substantial 
foundation. Despite this, Japanese voters re-elected him and voted for the privatization. This 
election demonstrated the immaturity of Japanese voters and their ignorance in casting votes for 
rhetoric rather than substance. The result was very surprising, especially in light of public polls 
that showed the Japanese people cared more for real issues. The same opinion poll mentioned 
earlier by Jiji Press revealed that 80 percent of voters felt that Mr. Koizumi owed them a clear 
explanation of the merit of Japan Post privatization.[13] However, when Mr. Koizumi insisted that 
this election was about Japan Post reform, a majority of people simply voted for it. If the election 
focused instead on Mr. Koizumi’s controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine or the role that 
Japan’s Self Defense Forces are playing in Iraq, Mr. Koizumi’s chances of ousting anti-reformers 
from parliament would have been much less likely. Clearly, he chose his issue carefully and 
prevailed.  
Mr. Koizumi ends his term in the fall of 2006. He openly states that he has no intention of 
extending his term. The final job of implementing Japan Post privatization will be the next leader’s 
job. Mr. Koizumi is paving the way for the next Prime Minister so that the reform he has started 
will be easily accomplished by his successor. Mr. Koizumi’s attempt to implement “small 
government” is noble. However, real reform is not about pushing through one’s personal beliefs 
and agenda. It should come from the masses that desire change and demand reform. Given the 
immaturity of Japanese voters and the lack of strong political leadership,[14] real reform in Japan 
may not happen for quite some time. 
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